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U.S. Military Use of Non-Lethal 
Weapons: Reality vs Perceptions 
Susan D. LeVine1 & Joseph A. Rutigliano, Jr.2 
On 31 March 2003, U.S. warfighters manned a checkpoint 
near Najaf, Iraq, mindful that a suicide bomber had just killed 
four U.S. soldiers at another Iraqi checkpoint. When a van 
failed to heed verbal warnings to stop, they used their only other 
option. They fired on the van, killing seven women and children. 
While these actions may have been lawful, these types of 
situations present U.S. forces with horrific moral dilemmas. 
U.S. forces require alternatives to simply shouting or shooting. 
Non-lethal weapons fill gaps between verbal warnings and lethal 
force. They have been urgently needed and used by U.S. forces 
in Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti. Non-lethal 
weapons have saved civilian lives, as one battalion commander 
in Iraq noted -- and also saved the lives of US warfighters. The 
need for non-lethal weapons grows as warfare and disasters 
increasingly occur in population centers, as well as, at sea, as 
small boats become the asymmetric weapon of choice.  
Since 1996, the U.S. Department of Defense has developed and 
fielded non-lethal weapons. Non-lethal weapons are “developed and 
used with the intent to minimize the probability of producing 
fatalities, significant or permanent injuries.” This intent is supported 
by an unequalled effort focused on explicit user needs and a thorough 
understanding of the human effects of non-lethal weapons 
 
1. Susan D. LeVine is the Principal Deputy Director for Policy and 
Strategy at the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD), where 
she serves as senior advisor to the Director, JNLWD, on matters related 
to policy and strategy, and in general, overall Department of Defense 
(DoD) Non-Lethal Weapons Program planning, financial investment and 
special topics of interest. She attended the University of South Carolina, 
receiving Bachelor and Master’s degrees in Physics. She is a member of 
the Defense Acquisition Community and has served as a government 
advisor to the Council on Foreign Relations and the Defense Science 
Board. 
2. Joseph Rutigliano has been the Deputy Branch Head for the 
International and Operational Law Branch, Judge Advocate Division, 
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, in the Pentagon, since July 
1998. He also serves as the Special Assistant on Law of War Matters to 
the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. His 
responsibilities include providing advice on law of war issues, 
international agreements, treaties, counterdrug operations, rules of 
engagement, rules for the use of force, intelligence matters, weapons 
reviews, and other areas of international and domestic law that impact 
military exercises, training, and operations. 
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employment. DoD policy also states that non-lethal weapons, “are not 
intended to, eliminate risk of those actions entirely,” meaning that 
non-lethal weapons do not come with a 100% guarantee of no injury 
or death. Additionally, non-lethal weapons undergo extensive legal 
review to ensure compliance with U.S. domestic law and international 
legal obligations, including the law of war.  
Yet, despite their need, underlying good intentions and 
lawfulness, and rigorous human effects analyses, non-lethal weapons – 
and associated technologies that are used to make them -continue to 
face objections and misperceptions, just like other transformative 
innovations. The reality, though, is that US warfighters, who 
repeatedly face life-and-death situations in a complex operating 
environment, want and need non-lethal weapons. 
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 “Getting a new idea adopted, even when it has obvious 
advantages, is difficult”  
—Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations3 
 
3. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 1 (2003). 
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I. Introduction 
On 31 March 2003, U.S. warfighters manned a checkpoint near 
Najaf, Iraq, mindful that a suicide bomber had just killed four U.S. 
soldiers at another Iraqi checkpoint. When a van failed to heed verbal 
warnings to stop, they used their only other option. They fired on the 
van, killing seven women and children.4 Such incidents continued, 
with US warfighters unable to tell if an advancing driver was a suicide 
bomber, or an innocent civilian fleeing danger or unable to 
understand the signs. But, checkpoint casualties eventually declined 
with warfighters’ use of non-lethal systems, like dazzling lasers for 
warning and vehicle stopping devices.5 
Non-lethal weapons fill gaps between verbal warnings and lethal 
force. They are often urgently needed by U.S. forces, and since 1996, 
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Non-Lethal Weapons program 
has helped meet those needs.6 According to DoD policy, these non-
lethal weapons are “developed and used with the intent to minimize 
the probability of producing fatalities, significant or permanent 
injuries,” while recognizing they, “are not intended to, eliminate risk 
of those actions entirely.”7 Moreover, non-lethal weapons are 
developed and used in compliance with U.S. laws and treaties.8 Yet, 
despite their growing need, the good intentions behind their 
development, and their lawfulness, non-lethal weapons continue to 
face objections and misperceptions. 
This article will address the growing operational necessity for non-
lethal weapons, the specific intent behind their development, e.g., the 
minimization of civilian casualties, and the legal review process to 
which all non-lethal weapons are subject. Finally, this article will 
address common misperceptions of the development and use of non-
lethal weapons in the hope that these misperceptions may be 
corrected and allow interested readers to understand that the intent 
behind non-lethal weapons is to put more humane alternatives in the 
 
4. Athalie Matthews, Civilians Killed by US Forces Amid Suicide Fears, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2003), http:// www. theguardian. com/ world/ 
2003/apr/01/iraq. 
5. Greg Jaffe, U.S. Curbs Iraqi Civilian Deaths In Checkpoint, Convoy 
Incidents, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2006 12:01 AM), http:// online. wsj. 
com/articles/SB114955863297172189. 
6. History, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, http:// jnlwp. 
defense.gov/About/History.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
7. DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW 
Policy, DoD Directive 3000.03E (Apr. 25, 2013) 
8. Non-Lethal Weapons FAQs, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, 
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/FrequentlyAskedQuestions/NonLethal
WeaponsFAQs.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
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hands of our warfighters rather than leaving them with the stark 
choice between “shouting and shooting.”  
II. Growing Operational Necessity 
A. Somalia—the Prologue 
DoD’s nonlethal weapons program grew out of the tactical needs 
of the U.S. operations in Somalia, between 1992 and 1995. Here, 
conflict and chaos occurred amongst the people—a change in the 
operational experience for Cold War-equipped forces, and a harbinger 
of things to come. With only verbal warnings and lethal force, U.S. 
forces were unable to stop the people from throwing rocks and 
Molotov cocktails,9 openly looting military equipment,10 and storming 
food trucks.11 Somalis knew U.S. forces only used lethal force for self-
defense.  
But, when self-defense was warranted, U.S. forces often faced 
horrific moral dilemmas. In the battle of Mogadishu, on 3–4 October 
1993, Somali children walked down the street, pointing out U.S. Army 
Rangers’ positions to a hidden shooter.12 U.S. forces also faced a 
Somali gunman completely covered by civilians; he lay prone between 
two kneeling women and had four children sitting on him. 13 While 
these civilians forfeited their protection against direct attack under 
the law because of their willful actions, U.S. service members should 
have more alternatives available than resorting to lethal force. 
It is legal to engage civilians who are directly participating in 
hostilities.14 However, “[k]illing these women and children did not 
 
9. ROBERT F. BAUMANN & LAWRENCE A. YATES WITH VERSALLE F. 
WASHINGTON, “MY CLAN AGAINST THE WORLD” US AND COALITION 
FORCES IN SOMALIA 1992-1994, 83 (2003). (“On 24 February, shortly 
after sunrise, Aideed’s followers began demonstrating at the US embassy 
compound and at other locations within his sectors of Mogadishu. The 
crowds threw rocks and Molotov cocktails, burned tires, and established 
barricades at various locations.”). 
10. Id. at 208 (“[G]roups of Somalis, driven by poverty, might mob foreign 
soldiers, making off with anything of value.”).  
11. Edward Liszka & Dennis B. Herbert, Non-Lethal Capabilities Are Now Viable 
Option in a Fast Changing Landscape, NAT’L DEF., Dec. 1997, at 17–18 (“In 
Somalia, Marines were confronted by hostile warlords using women and children 
as shields. Hordes of Somalis stormed trucks loaded with food despite verbal 
warnings and armed presence.”). 
12. BAUMANN ET AL., supra note 7, at 209 (“During the battle of 3-4 
October, for example, Aideed’s militiamen used what was for them a 
traditional tactic of employing women and children to shield gunmen 
and to identify the position of US troops.”). 
13. MARK BOWDEN, BLACKHAWK DOWN 42–43, 46 (1999). 
14. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POL’Y & CONFLICT RES., IHL AND CIVILIAN 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES IN THE OPT 3 (2007). 
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come easily to American soldiers, but in the effort to stay alive, kill 
them they did, and at close range,” wrote Robert F. Baumann, 
Lawrence A. Yates, and Versalle F. Washington in the Army study, 
“My Clan Against the World”—US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 
1992-1994.15 
In preparing for the 1995 U.N. withdrawal from Somalia, U.S. 
Marines adopted non-lethal weapons. Marines saw them as helping 
minimize civilian casualties, while countering looters and rioters, who 
sought credit for “driving the Americans back into the sea.”16 Marine 
reservists, who used them in law enforcement, trained Marines to use 
oleoresin capsicum “pepper” spray; non-lethal shotgun rounds; 
non-lethal grenades projecting small rubber balls; road spikes or 
“caltrops”; and other devices. They were seen as force options, in 
addition to lethal force, but were not intended to replace the use of 
lethal force.17 
These non-lethal weapons deterred hostile crowds. While they had 
limited use in the withdrawal, Marines communicated their 
capabilities to the Somali population in advance. The U.N. withdrew 
from Somalia smoothly and without casualties.18 Afterwards, task 
force commander, Lieutenant Gen. Anthony Zinni, USMC, reported, 
“Our experience in Somalia with non-lethal weapons offered ample 
testimony to the tremendous flexibility they offer to warriors on the 
field of battle.”19 
Despite being well received by many users, non-lethal weapons 
were misperceived by others. Varying critics saw them as unworkable, 
 
15. See BAUMANN ET AL., supra note 7, at 209. 
16. Stanton Coerr, For Those in Harm’s Way, PROCEEDINGS, April 2002, at 
42–43. 
17. NICK LEWER & STEPHEN SCHOFIELD, NONLETHAL WEAPONS: A FATAL 
ATTRACTION? 68–69 (1997). 
18. See Lt. Col. James C. Duncan, A Primer on the Emplyoment of Non-
Lethal Weapons, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 3 (1998). 
19. RICHARD L. SCOTT, CONFLICT WITHOUT CASUALTIES: NONLETHAL WEAPONS 
IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 6–7 (2007) (“In 1995, Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni 
anticipated the need to fill the void between verbal warnings and lethal 
force for unarmed hostiles while extracting United Nations (UN) 
peacekeepers from Somalia. His plan involved the withdrawal of over 6000 
coalition troops. He used intelligence operations to ensure the local 
population was informed that his forces were armed and ready with non-
lethal grenade launchers and shotguns that fired pepper sprays, stinger 
grenades, flash bangs, and sticky foam, as well as caltrops to supplement 
various barriers at night. In the end, not a single shot was fired and all 
troops and equipment were withdrawn without suffering a Task Force 
casualty.”). 
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unethical, and eroding the warrior ethos20—the first of many 
misperceptions that were to follow. 
But, the strongest supporters were warriors who knew war’s moral 
dilemmas, particularly when lethal force was the only option. 
Referring to non-lethal weapons, then-Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, Gen. Charles Krulak, wrote in 1995, “[t]heir use better enables 
us to respond proportionately and with greater flexibility to the wide 
range of threats we can expect to face today and in the future.”21  
More emphatic was Gen. John J. Sheehan, USMC, then-Supreme 
Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander, U.S. Atlantic 
Command: “This nation should no longer tolerate dedicated, 
professional troops equipped with the wrong tools for new, more 
complex missions….Non-lethal weapons must be part of today’s tool 
kit.”22 
B. You Can’t Kill Your Way to Victory—The Need for Non-Lethals 
Expands 
In 1996, the Non-Lethal Weapons Program was established, with 
Gen. Krulak readily accepting executive agent responsibilities. DoD 
issued policy noting that non-lethal weapons, “should enhance the 
capability of U.S. Forces to…take military action in situations where 
use of lethal force is not the preferred option.” Additionally, the 
policy stated that “The availability of non-lethal weapons shall not 
limit a commander’s inherent authority and obligation to use all 
necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-
defense.”23   
It was fortuitous. In the world ahead, U.S. forces’ need for non-
lethal weapons would increase significantly and their use would 
expand in scope as illustrated below: 
•Sevce, Kosovo: A small number of U.S. forces fired non-lethal 
munitions, sponge grenades and stinger rounds, to stop a much 
larger, rock-throwing crowd.24 
•Al Kut, Iraq: In a city of 300,000, a Marine infantry battalion 
used non-lethal weapons almost daily to control crowds, often 
angry due to late fuel trucks. Eventually, just the breakout of 
 
20. NICK LEWER & STEPHEN SCHOFIELD, NONLETHAL WEAPONS: A FATAL 
ATTRACTION? 69–71 (1997). 
21. Id. at 71. 
22. LT. COL. ERIK L. NUTLEY, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: SETTING OUR 
PHASERS ON STUN? POTENTIAL STRATEGIC BLESSINGS AND COURSES OF 
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD 8 (2003). 
23. Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, DoD Directive 3000.3 (Jul. 9, 1996). 
24. Eric Adams, Shoot to Not Kill, POPULAR SCIENCE, May 2003, at 90.  
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the OC, or pepper spray cylinder, caused crowds to disperse. 
“Many Iraqi lives were saved as a direct result of 2/8 [2d 
Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment] employment of NLW,” stated 
the battalion commander, Col. Royal Mortenson.25 
•Afghanistan: U.S. forces use dazzling lasers to deter rock 
throwing locals from damaging vehicles or injuring troops; 
military convoys used non-lethal lasers to alert civilian vehicles 
and prevent collisions and hazards, thus saving lives (See 
YouTube’s Non-lethal GLARE laser dazzler in Afghanistan).26 
•Haiti: At a checkpoint, U.S. forces used a vehicle-stopping net 
with spikes to stop a fleeing car. This vehicle stopping net also 
was used in Iraq and Afghanistan.27  
•Guantanamo, Cuba: U.S. forces used OC, or pepper spray, to 
control a detainee disturbance in 2006, as well as, non-lethal 
munitions, to disperse a rock-throwing crowd in 2013.28 
In 2011, then-Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. 
Joseph Dunford, stated, the “demand for non-lethal weapons exceeds 
the inventory.”29 They had become critical in the counterinsurgency 
campaign in Afghanistan. “Counterinsurgents cannot succeed if they 
harm the people they are striving to protect,” stated International 
Security Assistance Force Commander General David Petraeus, who 
directed subordinates to identify their top ten non-lethal weapons.30 
 
25. See Interview with Col. Royal Mortenson, U.S. Marine Corps, in 
Quantico, Va. (Aug. 17, 2005) (on file with author). 
26. Rotifers, Non-Lethal GLARE Laser Dazzler in Afghanistan, YOUTUBE 
(Apr. 2, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mD_ciCZJ7q0. 
27. Police, Camera, Zapper: A futuristic gadget which disables suspect 
vehicles with radio waves could soon be used by police in car chases. It’s 
their latest weapon in safely ending pursuit, BBC NEWS (Jul. 14, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/3890127.stm. 
28. Michael Isikoff, ‘Non-lethal Round’ Fired at Gitmo Detainees in Soccer 
Field Incident, US military Confirms, NBC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/07/17228617-non-
lethal-round-fired-at-gitmo-detainees-in-soccer-field-incident-us-military-
confirms.  
29. James K. Sanborn, Dunford: Marines Will Continue to Be Needed, 
MARINE CORPS TIMES (Apr. 14, 2011), http:// www. 
marinecorpstimes.com/article/20110414/NEWS/104140324/Dunford-
Marines-will-continue-needed.  
30. Heather Maher, U.S. General Cites ‘Significant’ Progress In Afghanistan, 
But Calls Gains ‘Fragile’, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Oct. 25, 2014), 
http:// www. rferl.org/ content/ petraeus_fragile_success_afghanistan/ 
2339325.html; Sjef Orbons, Are Non‐Lethal Weapons a Viable Military 
Option to Strengthen the Hearts and Minds Approach in Afghanistan?, 28 
DEF. & SEC. ANALYSIS 114, 115 (2008) (“There is a need, therefore, for 
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U.S. forces are not the only ones that seek to minimize casualties 
in operations. Coalition partners and allies seek to do the same. 
Increasingly, US forces have helped build non-lethal capabilities with 
the forces of such partner nations as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Mongolia, Philippines, Romania, and more.31 
C. Future—The Needs Grow 
In the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, non-lethal weapons 
were used when riots occurred at food distribution sites.32 They are 
essential in dealing with a populace that becomes desperate after 
natural disasters, which occur five times as often as they did in the 
1970s, according to a 2014 UN report, and predicted to increase in 
frequency and severity.33  
War among the people—irregular warfare—continues, with 
disturbing trends, demanding non-lethal weapons. U.S. forces have 
 
adequate training and the means to stop a vehicle,  without having to open 
fire. Petraeus called for novel and effective ways to neutralise such a threat 
without having to use lethal force. In doing so, he also encouraged the use 
of non-lethal weapons (NLWs) and asked US force planners to identify their 
top 10 NLWs.”). 
31. See, Cpl. Erik Estrada, NOLES 2014 Comes to a Close, DEF. VIDEO & 
IMAGERY DISTRIBUTION SYS. (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.dvidshub.net/ 
news/139768/noles-2014-comes-close#.VExDY_nF-Sq; Donna Miles, 
Marines Lead Multinational Nonlethal Weapons Training, DEP’T DEF. 
NEWS (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/ news/ 
newsarticle.aspx?id=120680; Charlie Coon, Troops Learn Nonlethal 
Crowd Control Techniques, STARS & STRIPES (Jun. 16, 2006), 
http://www.stripes.com/news/troops-learn-nonlethal-crowd-control-
techniques-1.50400. 
32. Lt. Col. John N. Ohlweiler, Building the Airplane While in Flight: 
International and Military Law Challenges in Operation Unified 
Response, ARMY LAW., Jan. 2011 at 17,18, 20; Services Hold Integrated 
Concept Team Meetings, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM 
NEWSLETTER (Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Quantico, VA), 
Nov. 2010, at 7 (“The U.S. Army Integrated Concept Team met June 
29-30 in St. Charles, Mo. Attendees received updates from the 
Sustainment Center of Excellence, which included a discussion of the 
non-lethal weapons that were successfully used during Haiti relief 
operations, as well as briefs on various non-lethal weapons programs and 
efforts”). 
33. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, Eight Ways Climate Change is Making 
the World More Dangerous, GUARDIAN (Jul. 14, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2014/jul/14/8-charts-
climate-change-world-more-dangerous?commentpage=2; To the Brink: 
Climate Change Will Increase Frequency and Severity of Disasters, 
Stress Food and Energy Productions in South Asia, WORLD BANK (Jul. 
24, 2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/06/24/ 
climate-change-natural-disasters-stress-food-energy-production-south-
asia. 
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faced human shields used by enemies in the World War II battle of 
Okinawa,34 Vietnam, Beirut, 35 Afghanistan, and Iraq. In these 
instances innocent men, women, and children were killed—and U.S. 
veterans lived with their ghosts, some suffering Post Traumatic 
Stress.36  
Amnon Rubinstein and Yaniv Roznei recently wrote that “[t]he 
use of human shields has dramatically escalated.”37 Reportedly, 
human shields have been used in Libya,38 Syria,39 Ukraine,40 
Yemen,41 and elsewhere. “…human shields during hostilities has 
become one of the major problems facing democracies in 
contemporary armed conflicts.”42  
Notably, the use of human shields escalated as media coverage 
and the media cycle increased. In World War II, nine reporters were 
with Marines at the 1943 Tarawa assault.43 In the July-August 2014 
 
34. LAURA HOMAN LACEY, STAY OFF THE SKYLINE: THE SIXTH MARINE 
DIVISION ON OKINAWA 67-68 (2005). 
35. Maj. Robert T. Jordan (USMC (Ret.)), Letter to the Editor, MARINE 
CORPS GAZ., Feb. 2008, at 6–7. 
36. Charlotte Tucker, U.S. Veterans Struggle with Pain, Stigma of Post-
Traumatic Stress: New Research Aimed at Mental Health, NATION’S 
HEALTH (Apr. 2012), http://thenationshealth.aphapublications.org/content/ 
42/3/1.1.full (“Iraq in 2003 was a nightmare C.J. Grisham could not wake 
up from. It was sustained, almost daily combat for months, and Grisham, a 
first sergeant in the Army, said he could feel the strain. Once, he said he 
was forced to shoot a person being used as a human shield.”). 
37. Amnon Rubinstein & Yaniv Roznai, Symposium: Defense Policy: 
Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The Need for a 
Proportionate Proportionality, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 94 (2011). 
38. Chris Stephen, Gaddafi Forces Using Human Shields, Libya Rebels Claim, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/ 
aug/28/gaddafi-forces-human-shields-libya.  
39. U.N. Accuses Syria of Using Children as Human Shields, CBS NEWS 
(Jun. 12, 2012, 9:28 AM) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/un-accuses-
syria-of-using-children-as-human-shields-kofi-annan-urges-nations-to-
twist-arms/. 
40. See Civilians in Slovyansk, Ukraine, Allegedly Used as Human Shields, 
NBC NEWS (May 5, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-
crisis/civilians-slovyansk-ukraine-allegedly-used-human-shields-n97156. 
41. Yemen Government: Rebels Use Civilians as Human Shields, CNN (Oct. 
13, 2009, 7:30 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/10/13/ 
yemen.human.shields/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD. 
42. Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 35, at 94. 
43. SEAN J.A. EDWARDS, MARS UNMASKED: THE CHANGING FACE OF URBAN 
OPERATIONS 40 n.5 (2000), http://www.rand.org/ pubs/ 
monograph_reports/MR1173.html (“Charles Rick notes that only nine 
civilian war correspondents were present on the island of Tarlac in the 
South Pacific in 1943…”). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
U.S. Military Use of Non-Lethal Weapons 
248 
conflict in Gaza, nearly 600 media units were in Israel and Palestine.44 
Moreover, social media rapidly transmits globally. In such 
environments, warring groups seek to exploit civilian casualties to 
build support for their side and opposition against the other. These 
groups hide among the civilian population putting the entire 
population at risk. While those civilians who voluntarily act as human 
shields may be considered to be directly participating in the hostilities 
thereby losing their protection against direct attack, the use of 
involuntary human shields creates quite the quandary for the 
warfighter.45 
A solution was advocated by Maj. Robert T. Jordan, USMC(Ret), 
recounting his Vietnam and Beirut experiences in the Marine Corps 
Gazette:  
“…impacting rockets drove the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) 
toward our position north of the Vu Gia River. Masking their 
movement were scores of civilians being driven in front of them. 
As the crowd neared our column along the river, artillery 
impacted to their rear, and our machine gunners launched 
bursts of fire over the civilians’ heads, hoping to impact among 
the NVA. Panicking civilians scattered, but some fell as the 
NVA opened up on their rear. Others ran into our machine gun 
fire…We made no friends that day. How different it might have 
been if we had non-lethal alternatives. I witnessed scores of 
similar incidents in Vietnam and later in Beirut where our 
options were either deadly force or to disengage. It is time that 
our military planners, logisticians, and tactical commanders add 
non-lethal alternatives to our war chests.”46 
The need for non-lethal weapons is not restricted to engagements 
on land; the need for non-lethal weapons is also increasing for the 
maritime environment. Small boats are the asymmetric weapon of 
choice, indistinguishable in heavily trafficked littorals. They 
previously have been used for: 
 
44. Nati Tucker, Gaza War Proves Big Draw to World Media, HAARETZ 
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-
gaza-conflict-2014/.premium-1.609064 (“[c]lose to 600 foreign journalists 
covering Gaza conflict, two thirds of which don’t report from the Israeli 
side, says director of Israel’s Government Press Office.”). 
45. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields In International 
Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 292 (2009) (discussing 
different theories of voluntary and involuntary human shields and the 
issue it presents to humanitarian law). 
46. See Jordan, supra note 33. 
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•Suicide bombings against ships, like the USS Cole in 2000 and 
French Limburg tanker in 200247 
•Bombings/attacks against infrastructure, as done by fishing 
dhows on Iraqi oil terminals in 200448 
•Terrorist landings as occurred in the 2008 Mumbai attack49 
•Pirating larger vessels, like the MV Maersk Alabama in 200950 
In ambiguous situations, the intent of unknown small boat 
operators may be determined with the aid of non-lethal capabilities, 
ranging from long range acoustic devices that provide a means to 
transmit hailing and warning messages to “flash bang” munitions that 
provide visual effects. Such non-lethal capabilities can help determine 
whether the apparent threatening actions of small boat operators are 
actually intended to cause harm, or are being done for completely 
other reasons, and thereby prevent a situation from developing into 
one where lethal force is used.  
Presently, U.S. vessels use acoustic hailers and dazzling lasers to 
warn and instruct approaching small boats. In the future, these 
capabilities could be augmented with systems that project heat-
producing, millimeter wave energy to repel small boat operators 
posing a threat to U.S. forces as was demonstrated in 2013.51  
These and other non-lethal capabilities could aid protection of 
shore-based facilities and infrastructure. Notably, unmanned surface 
vessels, equipped with acoustic hailers, dazzling lasers, and flash-bang 
 
47. Raphael Perl & Ronald O’Rourke, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: 
Background and Issues for Congress, NAVY DEP’T LIB. (Jan. 30, 2001), 
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/usscole_crsreport.htm/; 
Yemen Says Tanker Blast Was Terrorism, BBC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2002), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2334865.stm. 
48. Two Sailors Killed in Arabian Gulf Oil Terminal Attacks, NAVY NEWS 
SERV. (Apr. 24, 2004, 6:21 PM), http://www.navy.mil/submit/ 
display.asp?story_id=12977. 
49. Joseph Teneglia, TDC Security Alert: Maritime Aspects of Mumbai 
Terrorist Attacks, MAR. EXEC. (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.maritime-
executive.com/article/tdc-security-alert-maritime-aspects-mumbai-
terror-attacks. 
50. Mark Mazzetti & Sharon Otterman, U.S. Captain Is Hostage of Pirates; 
Navy Ship Arrives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2009), http:// www. 
nytimes.com/2009/04/09/world/africa/09pirates.html. 
51. Staff Sgt. Wesley Farnsworth, Fort Eustis Participates in Non-Lethal 
Operational Demonstration, U.S. MARINE CORPS NEWS (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/3488/Articl
e/150140/fort-eustis-participates-in-non-lethal-maritime-operational-
demonstration.aspx. 
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munitions, could operate forward and respond to intruder vessels. 
This capability was demonstrated in 2012.52 
There is also growing need to non-lethally stop, search, and seize 
suspect vessels. Today, U.S. Coast Guard vessels use non-lethal 
ammunition, as well as, propeller-entangling nets to stop high-speed 
vessels.53 Navy boarding teams use non-lethal and lethal weapons 
when searching suspect vessels.54 In the future, non-lethal capabilities 
will be needed to stop large, displacement hull vessels, suspected of 
illicit trafficking -- humans, drugs, and/or weapons -- as well as 
carrying weapons of mass destruction. 
III. Intent—and Unequalled Effort 
DoD’s non-lethal weapons are intended “to prevent the target 
from functioning” and “have relatively reversible effects on personnel 
or materiel,” while also recognizing that the risk of fatalities and 
injuries cannot be eliminated entirely.55 DoD’s intent also is reflected 
in unequaled efforts to maximize the effectiveness of non-lethal 
weapons while minimizing their risk of significant injury or death. 
Central to these efforts are human effects studies, analysis, and 
independent reviews56 and related efforts such as those in the 
following areas. 
A. Determining the “Goalposts” for Effectiveness—Explicit User Needs 
Non-lethal weapons “are explicitly designed and primarily 
employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel 
immediately.”57 “Explicit design” is based on explicit user needs, 
defined by the tasks that users need to conduct the mission. For 
example, users may need a capability to non-lethally counter 
personnel, which could involve such tasks as denying access; moving 
or disabling personnel; or suppressing performance. Specific conditions 
 
52. Navy Equips Unmanned Boats with Non-Lethal Weapons for Fleet 
Experiment, NAVY NEWS SERV. (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=65164. 
53. U.S. COAST GUARD, A HISTORY OF COAST GUARD AVIATION 14 (2008) 
https://www.uscg.mil/history/webaircraft/CGAviationHistory1994_200
8.pdf. 
54. NAVY NEWS SERV., supra note 50. 
55. DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW 
Policy, DoD Directive 3000.03E (Apr. 25, 2013). 
56. Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Human Effects Characterization, DoD 
Directive 3200.19 (May 17, 2012). 
57. Id. 
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and standards are also defined, for example, the range and duration of 
effects required.58 
Explicit needs are assessed against existing and emerging 
technologies and their human effects, and then evaluated for their 
potential to meet them. For example, the improved flash bang 
grenade may rate high for suppressing a specified behavior, while a 
blunt impact, shotgun round may have only medium potential.  
B. Characterizing Human Effects—How Close They Get to the Goalposts 
This characterization is needed to determine if a non-lethal 
weapon is likely to work as intended, both in terms of effectiveness 
and minimizing the risk of significant injury. Thus, human effects are 
characterized in non-lethal weapons development, as mandated by 
DoD policy.    
Non-lethal weapons development progressively characterizes 
human effects, achieving prescribed “human effectiveness readiness 
levels.”59 Generally, this progressive characterization occurs as 
outlined below: 
•Cause-and-effect observed and postulated: These achieve 
human effects readiness levels 0-2. An example is the discovery 
and investigation of human effects associated with the Active 
Denial System, which repels individuals. In 1988, Air Force 
Research Lab personnel observed 94 GHz millimeter wave 
energy causing aversive responses. They postulated that the 
energy penetrated and heated skin, and stimulated nerve 
endings.60  
•Cause-and-effect confirmed; small animal models determined 
when effects do and do not occur; and risk of injury and 
effectiveness postulated for human population segments: These 
achieve human effects readiness levels 3-4. For example, in the 
1990s, researchers found that rats avoided 94 GHz millimeter 
wave energy, and confirmed that energy was deposited in skin, 
rapidly heating and stimulating nerve endings. Researchers 
believed that by limiting exposures, thermal injuries could be 
avoided in humans.61  
 
58. See generally SUSAN LEVINE, THE ACTIVE DENIAL SYSTEM: A 
REVOLUTIONARY, NON-LETHAL WEAPON FOR TODAY’S BATTLEFIELD 
(2009), http:// www.dtic.mil/ dtic/ tr/fulltext/ u2/ a501865.pdf 
(advocating for further use of NLW in situations that present risk, 
whether or not they be combat situations). 
59. See DoD Directive 3200.19, supra note 54. 
60. LEVINE, supra note 56, at 6. 
61. Id. 
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•Effects gradually assessed in humans or surrogates in lab and 
field: Achieves human effects readiness levels 5-7. In developing 
the Active Denial System in the late 1990s, volunteers were 
exposed to small spots of millimeter wave energy on their backs, 
in a lab, leading to larger exposures, under controlled 
conditions. In 2001, an Active Denial System prototype made 
back and frontal exposures on static volunteers at intended field 
ranges, repelling over 95 percent. In 2003, exposures were made 
on moving personnel in the field, repelling as well.62   
•Human or surrogate participation in realistic field or 
operational testing. This achieves human effects readiness levels 
8-9. Since 2005, the Active Denial System has repelled volunteer 
personnel in field, urban, and maritime environments, totaling 
over 12,000 exposures.63 
C. Incorporating Human Effects Research into Systems Design 
Characterizing a non-lethal weapon’s human effects includes 
determining possible injuries, conditions of occurrence, and risk of 
injury margins. For example, research determined that Active Denial 
System exposures, longer than prescribed times, would cause thermal 
injuries, and specified those times, so they could be avoided. That 
information was incorporated into the system’s design so that 
appropriate controls would minimize risk of overexposure. For the 
long range, large spot size capability developed under an Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstration program,64 the Active Denial 
System’s risk of significant injury was determined to be 0.009-0.1 
percent. 
D. Conducting Independent Reviews 
DoD guidance requires that non-lethal weapons human effects 
analysis be independently reviewed by a Human Effects Review Board 
“comprised of the DoD Health Effects Officer; members representing 
the Surgeon Generals of each Service (including the Medical Officer of 
the U.S. Marine Corps); and U.S. Special Operations Command, as 
applicable; and a safety representative from each Service and US 
Special Operations Command.”65 
 
62. JOHN M. KENNY ET AL., A NARRATIVE SUMMARY AND INDEPENDENT 
ASSESSMENT OF THE ACTIVE DENIAL SYSTEM 21–22 (2008), 
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/Future_Non-
Lethal_Weapons/HEAP.pdf. 
63. LEVINE, supra note 56, at 6–7. 
64. Id. at 3. 
65. DoD Directive 3200.19, supra note 54. 
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IV. Legal and Non-Lethal 
During Operation United Shield in Somalia, it was reported that 
as an armed mob of Somalis approached a U.S. Marine position, a 
Marine aimed a low-powered Saber 203 laser66 at an individual in the 
center of the mob. Upon being “lit up” by the bright red light, the 
rest of the mob took notice and fled the area, leaving the man 
standing alone.67   
Subsequent to this incident, a nongovernmental organization 
claimed such lasers could blind, “were unnecessarily cruel...repugnant 
to the public conscience,” and should be banned.68 This call supported 
the two-decade long effort by Sweden and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross to obtain a ban on blinding lasers. This 
effort culminated in the adoption by the States Parties to the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons69 of a blinding laser 
protocol in 1995.70 The blinding laser protocol arguably banned a non-
existent weapon,71 and would not have banned the Saber 203 laser 
used by the Marine in Somali. Notwithstanding, after dazzling lasers 
were deployed at checkpoints in Iraq and Afghanistan, other 
organizations claimed they too violated international law.72 
 
66. U.S. AIR FORCE, FACT SHEET, PERSONNEL HALTING AND SIMULATION 
RESPONSE (PHASR) (Apr. 2006), http://www.kirtland.af.mil/ 
shared/media/document/AFD-070404-043.pdf (“Lightweight, simple to 
operate, and easy to handle, Saber 203 could also be used as a laser 
designator. It could counter night vision devices. The system was used 
successfully in 1995 by U.S. Marines in Somalia during Operation 
United Shield.”). 
67. JAMES ADAMS, THE NEXT WORLD WAR: COMPUTERS ARE THE WEAPONS 
AND THE FRONT LINE IS EVERYWHERE 142 (1998) 
68. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT: U.S. 
BLINDING LASER WEAPONS REPORT (1995), http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/1995/Us2.htm. 
69. United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature April 
10, 1981, 1342 U.NT.S. 137 [hereinafter CCW Convention]. 
70. Protocol to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects of Oct. 10, 1980, adopted 
Oct. 13, 1995, T.I.A.S. No. 09-721.2 [hereinafter CCW Convention 
Protocol IV]. 
71. W. Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 Y.B. 
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 55, 85 (2005). 
72. Military Under Fire for Planned Laser Purchase, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Jul. 
11, 2008), http:// www.canada.com/ topics/news/ national/ 
story.html?id=677f248c-7329-4a9e-bb40-3117dda52169.  
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Despite these claims of illegality, the use of dazzling lasers, as well 
as all DoD’s non-lethal weapons, is lawful. This is ensured by an 
extensive legal review process that is required by DoD regulation,73 
and implementation by each Military Department.74  
These regulations require that all weapons, weapon systems, and 
ammunition undergo a legal review before procurement to ensure 
compliance with U.S. domestic law and our international legal 
obligations, including the law of war.75 Program managers overseeing 
the development and procurement of all potential weapons or weapon 
systems are required to ensure that a legal review is conducted of such 
item before the award of the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development contract and again before the award of the initial 
production contract. No weapon or weapon system may be acquired 
or fielded without this legal review.76 The request for a legal review 
should include a description of the intended use of the weapon 
system, weapon specifications, and the results of any tests on the 
wounding effect, such as human effects testing.77  
The legal review must address three specific areas: whether the 
weapon or weapon system causes unnecessary suffering; whether the 
weapon or weapon system is discriminate in its effect; and whether a 
specific rule of law or treaty prohibits or otherwise restricts the use of 
the weapon or weapon system.78 It is strongly recommended that in 
the early stages of development or procurement, potential weapons 
undergo a preliminary legal review to ensure its intended use is 
consistent with domestic and international law. Such reviews are 
 
73. The Defense Acquisition System, DoD Directive 5000.01 (May 12, 2003). 
74. See U.S. Army, Reg. 27-53, Review of Legality of Weapons Under 
International Law (1 Jan. 1979) [hereinafter AR 27-53]; U.S. Air Force, 
Instr. 51-402, Legal Reviews of Weapons and Cyber Capabilities (27 
July 2011) [hereinafter AFI 51-402]; U.S. Navy, Sec’y of the Navy Instr. 
5000.2E, Department of the Navy Implementation and Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (1 Sept. 2011).   
75. The “law of war” is defined as, “That part of international law that 
regulates the conduct of armed hostilities.  It is often called the ‘law of 
armed conflict.’  The law of war encompasses all international law for 
the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual 
citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the 
United States is a party, and applicable customary international law.” 
See DoD Law of War Program, DoD Directive 2311.01E (Feb. 22, 
2011). 
76. Department of the Navy Implementation and Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System, SecNav Instruction 5000.2E 1 (Sept. 1, 2011). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
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intended to identify issues early, thus preventing costly remedies 
later.  
Specific DoD policy on non-lethal weapons also requires non-lethal 
weapons to undergo the same legal review process.79 Moreover, DoD 
policy notes the importance of the human effects testing in legal 
reviews, directing that “human effects assessment data is provided to 
the servicing legal office to support the legal review of non-lethal 
weapons required during the acquisition process.”80 
In addition to human effects testing, legal reviews take into 
account a non-lethal weapon’s technical functioning, operating 
parameters, and intended use. It is also understood that the term 
“non-lethal” is referring to the users’ intention, and that non-lethal 
weapons are not expected to have a zero probability of fatalities or 
permanent injuries.81  
Additionally, legal reviews consider the differences between lethal 
and non-lethal weapons. Lethal weapons may lawfully destroy targets 
through blast, penetration, or fragmentation, or may kill or seriously 
injure enemy combatants or other persons posing a threat or potential 
threat to life or limb of U.S. forces. On the other hand, non-lethal 
weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to 
prevent the target from functioning. Non-lethal weapons are intended 
to have relatively reversible effects on personnel or materiel.82 Non-
lethal weapons are to be employed to, among other things, deter, 
discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions; de-escalate situations to 
preclude lethal force;83 and to reinforce deterrence and expand the 
range of options available to commanders.84 As with lethal weapons, 
non-lethal weapons undergo the same analysis in the legal review 
process.85 
 
79. DoD Directive 3000.03E, supra note 53.  
80. DoD Directive 3200.19, supra note 54. 
81. DoD Directive 3000.3E, supra note 53. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. SecNav Instruction 5000.2E, supra note 74 (defining “weapons” and 
“weapon systems” to include non-lethal weapons). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
U.S. Military Use of Non-Lethal Weapons 
256 
 
A. Unnecessary Suffering 
Relevant treaty law for this principle is contained in the Hague 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
of 18 October 1907, in particular, Article 23(e) of its Annexed 
Regulations.86 Article 23(e) prohibits the employment of “arms, 
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”87 
This prohibition against unnecessary suffering acknowledges that 
suffering to combatants is both lawful and expected, and may even 
include severe injury or death. While there is no accepted definition of 
the term, “unnecessary suffering,” the appropriate determination is 
whether the weapon’s employment in its normal expected use 
inevitably would cause injury, including death, that  is manifestly 
disproportionate to the weapons stated purpose and the expected 
military advantage to be gained by the use.88  
“This balancing test cannot be conducted in isolation”“ write US 
Army lawyers Richard B. Jackson and Jason Ray Hutchison in their 
article, Lasers Are Lawful as Non-Lethal Weapons.89 “A weapon or 
munition’s effects must be weighed in light of comparable, lawful 
weapons or munitions in use on the modern battlefield.” 90  
In weighing the need for stopping most vehicles at Iraqi and 
Afghan checkpoints, glare-producing lasers were seen as having more 
proportionate effects than lethal force, as indicated by U.S. Army Lt. 
Gen. Pete Chiarelli in a 19 May 2006, DoD news briefing: 
[W]hen you consider the alternative, which is a bullet, I 
honestly believe we can use [lasers]; we can use them effectively. 
We can use them in ways that don’t necessarily even, quote, 
unquote, “light up” the individual, but provide a marker so 
individuals realize that they are approaching a danger point. 
And we will do everything possible to inform the Iraqi people of 
their use, so when they see them, they react appropriately.91 
 
86. Hague Convention (IV), Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 187 CTS 227, 1 Bevans 631 (hereinafter, for the 
Convention, “Hague IV,” for the Regulations, “Hague IV Regs”). 
87. Id., at art. 23(e). 
88. Parks, supra note 69, at 140. 
89. Richard B. Jackson & Jason Ray Hutchison, Lasers Are Lawful as Non-
Lethal Weapons, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2006, at 17. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 12; DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Chiarelli from Iraq, U.S. 
DEF. DEP’T (May 19, 2006), http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/ 
Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=252. 
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By definition, most non-lethal weapons have no problem passing 
this part of the legal review test. 
B. Discrimination 
A fundamental principle of the law of war is that combatants and 
military objectives must be distinguished from noncombatants, 
civilians, and civilian objects. Only combatants and military 
objectives can be legitimately targeted.92 Indiscriminate or “blind” 
weapons are prohibited. Indiscriminate weapons are those that are as 
likely to hit innocent civilians and civilian objects, as well as, lawful 
military objectives.93 “If a weapon cannot be controlled in such a 
manner that it is capable of being directed against a lawful target, 
then it fails the discriminate effects test,” wrote Jackson and 
Hutchison.94 In the case of dazzling lasers at checkpoints, Jackson and 
Hutchison also wrote,  
[U]se of the weapons facilitates discrimination of targets and 
prevention of unnecessary civilian casualties. Determining the 
potential threat of oncoming vehicles has proven extremely 
difficult, and current methods of arm waving and flare firing to 
warn approaching vehicle drivers have had limited success. The 
... laser “dazzlers” will provide Soldiers the ability to 
communicate a visual signal to approaching vehicle driver’s to 
stay back while concurrently assisting in the Soldier’s 
determination of the driver’s intent.95  
Moreover, dazzling lasers are extremely discriminate in that they 
are “point-of-aim, point-of-impact” systems. 
C. Specific Law or Treaty Prohibiting Use 
All laws and treaties are reviewed for their applicability to non-
lethal weapons. In the case of dazzling lasers, the relevant treaty is 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Protocol IV 
on Blinding Laser Weapons. Article 1 of Protocol IV, states, “[i]t is 
prohibited to employ laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole 
combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause 
 
92. Civilians who take a direct part in hostilities, or civilian objects used for 
a military purpose, may also be targeted. See Yoram Dinstein, 
Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in International Armed 
Conflicts, 84 INT’L LAW STUDS. 183 (2008). 
93. See Parks, supra note 69, at 129; see also Hague IV Regs., supra note 
84, at arts. 25-27; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
94. Jackson & Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 17. 
95. Id. at 18.  
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permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or 
to the eye with corrective eyesight devices.”96   
Dazzling lasers are excluded from this definition because they 
cause at best, temporary blinding or a dazzling affect. They do not 
cause permanent blindness when used appropriately. According to 
Jackson and Hutchison, “None of the discussed laser systems were 
‘specifically designed’ to cause permanent blindness, nor will standard 
circumstances of use inflict such injuries.”97 Therefore, Protocol IV 
does not prohibit or restrict in any way the use of dazzling lasers for 
anti-personnel purposes. 
This determination was supported by human effects testing and 
the intended uses of the dazzling lasers. Human effects were 
quantified in research and testing,98 conducted by DoD laboratories. 
This included determining the conditions when these lasers were safe, 
and when they injured. The results informed the development of 
tactics and procedures for dazzling laser use at checkpoints, thus 
helping avoid eye injuries.99 
Once a legal review determines the legality of a non-lethal 
weapon, the weapon is then ready to be procured and fielded. It is 
important to note that the legal review does not address law of war 
issues related to targeting. These issues must be addressed at the time 
of employment, to be determined by the on-scene commander under 
the circumstances ruling at the time. Such issues are not 
determinative of the lawfulness of the weapon. The commander 
authorizing a weapon’s use must consider its characteristics, where 
civilians are present, in order to ensure consistency with mission rules 
of engagement and law of war proscriptions on directing attacks at 
civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities or who otherwise do not 
pose a threat to U.S. forces.100 
 
96. CCW Convention Protocol IV, supra note 68, art. 1. 
97. Jackson & Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 18.  
98. Id. at 15–16.  
99. Id. 
100. See Parks, supra note 69, at 141, n. 273; see also id. at 17. 
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V. Misperceptions and Resistance—Common to Many 
Innovations 
“If you got an innovative idea, and the majority does not pooh-
pooh it, then the odds are you must not have a very good idea,” said 
CNN founder Ted Turner.101 Many innovations go against 
conventional wisdom and existing order; non-lethal weapons are no 
exception. Despite demonstrated operational need, documented intent 
to minimize fatalities, unequalled effort to characterize human effects 
and risk of significant injury, and compliance with all applicable laws 
and treaties, DoD’s non-lethal weapons often face misperceptions as 
illustrated below: 
•The moniker “non-lethal” means zero percent chance of injury 
or death: Defense Department policy explicitly states that non-lethal 
weapons are developed and used with the intent of minimizing the 
probability of producing fatalities or significant injuries. The policy 
also recognizes that non-lethal weapons are not intended to be risk 
free. The label “non-lethal” was chosen by the DoD to emphasize the 
intent of these capabilities. There are no guarantees with non-lethal 
weapons, rather they represent a dedicated effort to provide U.S. 
warfighters additional options when use of lethal force is not 
desired.102 
•Non-lethal weapons can be used indiscriminately: Although some 
may speculate on whether the principal of discrimination should not 
apply to the use of non-lethal weapons,103 as the previous section in 
this article described, U.S. military use of non-lethal weapons must be 
in accordance with the law of war. Any non-lethal weapon fielded by 
the U.S. military will have completed legal review to ensure the 
 
101. HAROLD EVANS ET AL., THEY MADE AMERICA 465 (2004). 
102. See Joseph Siniscalchi, Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for 
Military Strategy 2 (Ctr. for Strat. & Tech., Air War Coll., Occasional 
Paper No. 3, 1998) (clarifying that the term non-lethal does not mean 
there is no risk of death or permanent injury). 
103. See Michael L. Gross, The Second Lebanon War: The Question of 
Proportionality and the Prospect of Non-Lethal Warfare, 7 J. MIL. 
ETHICS 1, 15-16 (2008) (“Unlike the use of ordinary weapons, non-lethal 
weapons deliberately target civilian noncombatants so that the harm 
they suffer is no longer incidental but intentional. Targeting civilians in 
this way requires that one subject the principle of noncombatant 
immunity to a ‘lesser evils’ test that compares a small amount of 
intentional harm with a greater level of non-intentional harm that comes 
from using high explosives. If the former is significantly less than the 
latter, then there are moral grounds to targeting civilian noncombatants 
with non-lethal weapons.”) 
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associated tactics, techniques, and procedures of its use will adhere to 
the principles of discrimination and proportionality.104  
•Slippery slope to war: Some have offered the opinion that the 
availability of non-lethal capabilities may increase the likelihood of 
war,105 a hypothesis unsupported by data or real world events. In a 
2013 speech to the National Defense University, President Obama 
stated a sentiment that has been expressed by many of his 
predecessors and other world leaders: “Alongside the decision to put 
our men and women in uniform in harm’s way, the decision to use 
force against individuals or groups—even against a sworn enemy of 
the United States—is the hardest thing I do as President.”106 Rather, 
when use of U.S. military force is necessary, the availability of non-
lethal capabilities in the warfighter’s toolkit provides additional 
options to support accomplishment of mission objectives while 
minimizing the probability of producing fatalities, significant or 
permanent injuries, or undesired damage to materiel or critical 
infrastructure.  
•Eroding warrior ethos and softening of U.S. forces: The idea 
that non-lethal weapons will make U.S. forces “soft” or create a 
kinder, gentler force is also unsubstantiated. The trademark of the US 
military will always be a force trained and equipped with 
overwhelming firepower. The biggest users of non-lethal force—special 
operators, U.S. Army units, and Marines—have transitioned to lethal 
force when needed. Commenting on the Marines experience in 
Somalia, Colonel Mike Stanton said non-lethal weapons showed the 
United States was willing “to go the extra mile” to avoid killing; were 
not at odds with the Marines’ warrior ethos; concerns they would 
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make troops “soft” proved unfounded; and that Marines still readily 
used lethal force when needed.107 
•Making warfare more lethal: Some have opined that non-lethal 
weapons could make warfare more lethal, for example, by using an 
incapacitating agent to render the enemy unconscious, and then 
engaging them with lethal force.108 But, this would be a violation of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention,109 and the law of war prohibition 
against attacking personnel who have been rendered hors de combat, 
that is, persons who have been rendered unconscious or otherwise 
incapacitated by wounds, sickness, or shipwreck, such that they are 
no longer capable of fighting.110 Moreover, the reality is that non-
lethal weapons are “explicitly designed and primarily employed to 
incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately, while 
minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired 
damage to property in the target area or environment” with 
predictable and intended reversible effects, allowing the affected 
target to return to pre-engagement functionality.111 Non-lethal 
weapons not only meet tactical and operational needs, but they also 
support our national interests, which includes “respect for universal 
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values at home and around the world,” as stated in the 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review.112  
•Media bias against non-lethal weapons: While non-lethal 
weapons have had their share of sensationalist headlines,113 many 
notable print and broadcast media outlets have provided balanced 
and unbiased reporting on a wide range of non-lethal capabilities and 
the expanded range of options they provide the U.S. military.114 In 
addition, the U.S. Congress continues to be supportive as reflected in 
specific references to non-lethal weapons operational utility in 
numerous National Defense Authorization Acts.115 
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VI. Not Easy, Not Always Seen...but Needed 
The pursuit of non-lethal capabilities by the U.S. military is a 
necessity in a complex world. Non-lethal weapons, by their very 
nature, must use new technologies or existing technologies in an 
innovative way, in order to provide the desired effects. As Everett M. 
Rogers wrote in Diffusion of Innovations, “Many innovations require 
a lengthy period of many years from the time when they become 
available to the time when they are widely adopted.116 Historical 
examples include opposition to the introduction of electricity in 
homes117, the inclusion of radios in automobiles118, and the use of 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging in medicine119. Additionally, between 
1975 and 1994, the Department of Defense canceled at least nine 
unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV, programs.120 Only after the 
Predator UAV was demonstrated in the mid-90s were UAVs widely 
used in defense. And, the Global Positioning System, which is 
ubiquitous today, survived numerous attempts to terminate it.121 
The reality is that non-lethal weapons already see greater use 
than most realize. Blunt trauma munitions are used to ward off 
intruders in restricted areas around bases in Afghanistan.122 For over 
ten years, Air Force Security personnel have used Tasers to patrol 
and protect bases and sensitive areas.123 And technological advances, 
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particularly in directed energy, promise more applications in the 
future.124  
For US forces, non-lethal weapons are not an esoteric issue. For 
them, they are intended to provide an option to lethal force, in a 
world in which military engagements continue to be characterized by 
environments where combatants and civilians are closely intermingled. 
They also save lives—those of U.S. military personnel, as well as, 
those of innocent civilians, caught in the midst of irregular warfare 
and disasters. And their use also says something about the United 
States, best stated by former Marine Corps Commandant, Gen. James 
F. Amos: “… our use of non-lethal weapons coupled with building 
partner capacity missions and (military-to-military) exchanges, 
strategically communicates our commitment to protect innocence and 
reassures our strategic friends and our allies.”125 
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